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Chapter 6
On the Role of Computers
in Creativity-Support Systems
Bipin Indurkhya
Abstract We report here on our experiences with designing computer-based
creativity-support systems over several years. In particular, we present the design
of three different systems incorporating different mechanisms of creativity. One of
them uses an idea proposed by Rodari to stimulate imagination of the children in
writing a picture-based story. The second one is aimed to model creativity in legal
reasoning, and the third one uses low-level perceptual similarities to stimulate cre-
ation of novel conceptual associations in unrelated pictures. We discuss lessons learnt
from these approaches, and address their implications for the question of how far
creativity can be tamed by algorithmic approaches.
6.1 Introduction
Even though the last few decades have seen a steady progress in the development of
computer systems that produce artifacts in the domain of visual art [8, 43], music
[7, 40, 44], literature [39, 51]; and so on, generally they have received a negative
press as regard to their creativity: computers cannot have emotions, programs do not
have intents, creativity cannot be algorithmic, and so on [4, 57]. Even designers of
computational creativity systems seem to take an apologetic tone when it comes to
ascribing creativity to their systems. For example, Colton [9] argues that it is not
enough to generate an interesting or creative artifact, but one must also take into
account the process by which the artifact was generated. Krzeczkowska et al. [38]
took pains to project some notion of purpose in their painting tool so that it might be
perceived as creative. Such views blatantly expose the implicit assumptions underly-
ing creativity: namely that it crucially needs a creator with emotions, intentions, and
such. A consequence of this view is that creativity is considered an essentially human
trait, and cannot be ascribed to computer programs or AI systems (or to animals like
elephants and gorillas).
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We critically examine this traditional view in the light of our previous experiences
in designing creativity-support systems and modeling creativity. We present three
very different case studies here, each of which incorporates a different mechanism
of creativity. These systems are based on our previous research, and we will mention
here only the main ideas behind each of the systems and the results. After a brief
discussion of these systems, we will present our views on the role of computers in
supporting and modeling creativity.
6.2 Some Case Studies of Computer-Based Creativity-Support
Systems
We have been studying and modeling different aspects of creativity for over twenty
years [23–34]. During this time, we have also explored various computational
approaches to creativity, and have developed some computational systems that stim-
ulate imagination and emergence of novel ideas and associations in the users, or
model such processes. We present here three such systems in order to provide some
concrete examples of how computers can play a crucial role in supporting creativity.
6.2.1 Stimulating Creativity in Generating Stories
We implemented a system Story Telling from Pictures [34] inspired by an idea Little
Red Riding Hood in a helicopter from Rodari’s fascinating book The Grammar of
Fantasy [54]. In this technique, children are given a list of five or six words, and
are asked to make a story that involves all of them. Rodari’s idea was that if all but
one of the words in the list are chosen so that they remind the children of some
familiar story, and one unrelated but familiar word is thrown in with them, children’s
imagination is stimulated in incorporating the unrelated concept in the familiar story.
Children enjoy this activity, and produce a great many imaginative variations of the
original story.
For example, suppose children are given the words ‘grandmother’, ‘wolf’, ‘for-
est’, ‘cape’, and ‘helicopter’. The first four words remind the children of the story
Little Red Riding Hood. However, the last word is completely unrelated. We must
emphasize here two necessary conditions for this technique to work. The first is that
the children must be familiar with the story Little Red Riding Hood. If they do not
know the story, or if the words used in the list do not remind them of the story, for
there are several versions of the story, then this technique is not so effective in terms
of stimulating imagination. The second condition is that the children must be familiar
with the unrelated word as well. If they have no idea what a helicopter is, then the
technique does not work either.
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In this technique, the children find it interesting and challenging to make a story
that incorporates the strange but familiar element (the helicopter) in the familiar story.
Each child tackles this task in her or his own way. Their imagination is stimulated,
and they enjoy the activity. They listen to each other’s stories, and react to them
enthusiastically.
Our creativity-support system based on this technique was implemented in three
stages. In the first stage, we showed a number of pictures to the children and asked
them to describe each picture. Our aim here was to find out the concepts with which
our target user group (the children) was familiar. In the second stage, we created a
library of picture elements, where each picture element depicted an object familiar to
the children. Picture elements were also organized in a semantic association network
to reflect which ones of them are related and which ones are not. In the third stage,
we composed a picture by combining picture elements such that all the picture ele-
ments were associated except one that was semantically distant or unrelated. So, for
example, the system might generate a picture of a cow in a classroom by combining
some classroom-related picture elements like desks, blackboard, notebooks, children
and teacher, and add the unrelated picture element cow. On evaluating the system,
we found that the children found writing about such pictures more interesting, and
they wrote longer stories.
This system was a straightforward implementation of Rodari’s technique. The
point we would like to emphasize is that it is not so difficult for a computer program
to add an unrelated object in a scene. However, this task is harder for people, for as
soon as a concept or word is given, all the associated concepts and their corresponding
words get automatically activated—it is difficult to suppress these activations and to
look beyond them to find an unrelated word or concept.
The T-puzzle (Fig. 6.1) provides an excellent example of how our past experi-
ences, and perceptual and conceptual associations constrain us. The puzzle has four
simple wooden pieces, and the objective is to arrange them in the form of the letter
T. However, people have a very hard time solving this puzzle because their prior
perceptual experiences keep them trying the same combinations over and over again
[62].
Fig. 6.1 The T-puzzle
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On analyzing many of Rodari’s techniques to stimulate creativity and imagination,
we find that they are essentially elaborate ways to get some unrelated combination
of words or concepts. When people try to connect these unrelated concepts in their
imagination, their creativity is stimulated. For example, in one method, two children
are asked to go to different rooms, close their eyes, open a dictionary at a random
page, and put their finger at some point on the open page. This produces two random
words, and then the children make a story connecting these two words. In another
activity, each child is asked to bring a picture from some newspaper or magazine. The
children sit in a circle, and all the pictures are put face down in the middle. Children
take turns at random (by drawing lots), and the child whose turn it is turns over one
of the pictures, and starts a story based on that picture. Each child (in random order)
repeats this process, except that all the subsequent children have to continue the story
generated so far by incorporating the picture they just turned over. This process is
akin to generating novel and creative metaphors by combining unrelated words or
concepts together [29].
In terms of computational modeling, at least this aspect of creativity is easily
modeled algorithmically [31]. This is because it is very difficult to model common-
sense conceptual associations on the computer, and it has been a challenging research
areas since the advent of Artificial Intelligence. This implies that it not difficult for
a computer program to break or ignore these conceptual associations and generate
a combination of two unrelated words or concepts. For us humans, on the contrary,
conceptual associations are an unalienable part of us, and so elaborate methods have
to be devised to look past those existing associations.
6.2.2 Modeling Creativity in Legal Reasoning Computationally
We now move to a completely different topic and present another piece of previous
research where we studied creativity in legal reasoning, and sought to model it
computationally [23, 25]. The main idea behind this approach was that creative
insights often come from applying the high-level structure (or gestalt) of one situation
to the low-level details of another situation. The distinction between the levels (high
and low levels) is important, for if both the situations are considered from a high level,
then only traditional analogy can result, which, as far as creativity is concerned, is
counterproductive (see [24, 29] for detailed arguments with examples). We explain
this approach with an example below.
We focused on situations where new categories are brought in to analogize or
distinguish between prior cases and a new case in order to argue for a particular
resolution of the new case. Our domain was a particular tax law in the US, which
allowed taxpayers to deduct their home-office expenses from their taxable income
under certain conditions. These exception conditions were based on factors such
as whether the home office was the principal place of business (PPB ) (e.g. when a
doctor saw patients regularly at a home clinic), whether the employer provided office
space for the employee, and so on.
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Fig. 6.2 A partial representation of the Cousino case (Dashed lines means provided by and dotted
lines mean designated space for.)
In particular, among the precedents, there was a case of a high-school teacher
Cousino, who claimed home-office deduction, but the courts denied him because the
school provided him a suitable space: a classroom where he could teach, and an
office equipped with a phone and office supplies. Let us refer to this as the Cousino
case. A partial representation of the Cousino case is shown in Fig. 6.2.
In this figure, three levels of representations are shown. The Facts level corre-
sponds to the low-level or perceptual features and the Ratio decidendi level corre-
sponds to the high-level conceptual or the gestalt features. At the Ratio decidendi
level, the justification for the decision is presented in abstract legal terms. An interme-
diate level of representation is also shown, which mediates between and connects the
high-level representation to the low-level representation. (See [25] for more details.)
Another case among the precedents concerned a concert violinist Drucker. He
claimed tax deduction for a studio he maintained at home where he practiced regu-
larly. The courts allowed him the deduction arguing that for musicians, their principal
activity is rehearsal, and the employer did not provide any space where the musi-
cian could rehearse. Let us call this the Drucker case. A partial representation of the
Drucker case is shown in Fig. 6.3.
Now consider the case of a college professor Weissman, who claims tax deduction
for an office he maintained at home. In the Weissman case, the college provided him
a shared office. But the taxpayer argued that because many staff members shared the
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Fig. 6.3 A partial representation of the Drucker case (Dashed lines means provided by, dotted
lines mean designated space for, and dot-dash lines means performed at. PPB is principal place of
business.)
office, he could not leave his books and other material safely there. Let us consider
this to be the new case.
With this background, the Cousino case is very similar to the Weissman case (the
new case) and supports a decision against Weismann. When the Drucker case is
applied to the facts of the Weissman case, we also get a decision against Weissman,
because for each task that the college professor had to perform as part of his duties,
there was some place (the shared office) provided by the employer. This situation is
shown in Fig. 6.4.
However, when the Cousino case is activated, the category suitable space comes
into play. Now we can reinterpret the Drucker using this category to argue that the
decision favored the taxpayer because the employer did not provide any suitable
space to carry out the activity. This reinterpretation of the Drucker case is shown in
Fig. 6.5.
With this reinterpretation, the Drucker case is rendered similar to the Weissman
case (the new case), and supports a decision in favor of Weissman as shown in
Fig. 6.6. (See [25] for details, and also [23].)
It may seem a small semantic quibble to some readers, but legal arguments often
hinge on such quibbles. There is another example discussed in [25] that hinges
on introducing the term substantial. We should also add that all the analyses and
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representations used in these examples were derived from actual opinions written by
the judges when rendering their decisions.
The implications of this for computational systems is that we need to be able to
model the process of reinterpretation, by which concepts and categories are applied
to different data (for which they may not have been intended) in novel ways. This is
consistent with recent research that suggests psychological distance as a mechanism
for enhancing creativity [60]. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that psychological
distance can be induced by such simple devices as taking another person’s perspective
or thinking of the problem as if it is unreal [35].
It is interesting to point out that the ability to get a new insight or perspective was
one of the advantages claimed for case-based reasoning when it was promoted by
Riesbeck and Schank ([53, pp. 9–14]). They compared and contrasted three modes of
reasoning: (1) reasoning with ossified cases (rules or abstract principles), (2) reason-
ing with paradigmatic cases (cases with a given interpretation), and (3) reasoning with
stories (cases with many possible interpretations and capable of re-interpretations).
They argued that it is the third mode of reasoning that displays the most flexibility
and power of having a knowledge base containing cases. However, most approaches
to case-based reasoning in the 1990s and early part of the 2000s worked largely with
indexed cases, which precludes this reinterpretation step. (See, for instance [6].) But
in recent years, advances in data mining and unsupervised learning techniques pro-
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Fig. 6.5 Cousino case applied to reinterpret the Drucker case by introducing the category suitable
space (Dashed lines means provided by, dotted lines mean designated space for, and dot-dash lines
means performed at PPB is principal place of business.)
vide us with many new approaches to model the reinterpretation process. (See, for
example [21, 65, 66].)
6.2.3 Role of Low-Level Perceptual Similarities in Stimulating
Novel Conceptual Associations
Finally, we present a third approach to creativity in which we assessed the role of low-
level perceptual similarities—namely similarities with respect to shape, color, tex-
ture, etc.—on emergent features when two images are juxtaposed. A feature related
to a metaphor is considered emergent if it is not normally related to either of the
two terms of the metaphor alone. For example, in “Her gaze, a flash of diamond”,
‘seduction’ is an emergent feature as it is not normally related to ‘gaze’ or ‘diamond’
[16]. A major methodological problem in working with images is in determining the
degree of low-level perceptual similarities between two given pictures. One alterna-
tive is to ask the participants to rate the degree of perceptual similarities between
pairs of pictures, but the drawback is that when we look at a picture, conceptual and
perceptual features interact heavily, and it is difficult to be certain that only perceptual
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features were used in determining the degree of similarity. To address this problem,
we turned to image-processing programs.
In the field of machine vision, a number of algorithms have been developed for
low-level visual processing. These algorithms extract features (like color, shape,
texture, and so on) of images, which are analogous to features found in the early
stages of visual processing in humans. So a similarity measure based on these features
would reflect perceptual similarity.
We used one such image-based search system called Fast Image Search in Huge
Database (FISH), which compares two images based on low-level perceptual features
like color, shapes, texture, etc., to get a similarity index for them [64]. We refer to
this as algorithmic perceptual similarity. For example, consider the pair of images
shown in Fig. 6.7. The image on the left is of the world-famous marble mausoleum
Taj Mahal that was built by the Moghul emperor Shah Jahan in the 17th century. The
image on the right is of wine bottles. These two images were given a high perceptual
similarity index by the FISH system. In fact, the wine bottles image was retrieved by
the system as a similar image when queried by the Taj Mahal image. If we examine
them carefully, we can see the perceptual similarities: the tall slender minarets of
the Taj Mahal are analogous to the shape of the wine bottles. However, when people
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Fig. 6.7 An example of algorithmic perceptual similarity
look at these two images, they tend to focus on conceptual aspects, and fail to find
any significant similarities, if they find them similar at all.
Using such stimuli, we experimentally studied how perceptual similarities cor-
relate with people’s ability to interpret pairs of images metaphorically, and with
emergence of new features that are not a part of either image [46]. Our results show
that a pair of perceptually similar images (in terms of color, shape, etc.) is more likely
to be given a metaphorical interpretation. Here are some examples of the interpreta-
tions given to the pair of images in Fig. 6.7 by the participants: ‘Becomes better as it
grows old’, ‘Standing pillars of tradition’, ‘Beauty in taste’, ‘Taste of history’, ‘Taj
for eyes, wine for tongue’, ‘What a waste of time.’ We also found that perceptual
similarity correlates positively with emergent features.
An implication of these results is that they provide yet another way in which com-
putational approaches can aid creativity. If this hypothesis—namely that low-level
perceptual similarities facilitate novel conceptual associations (among people)—is
correct then a computational system based on an algorithmic approach to perceptual
similarity will be quite effective in stimulating creative imagination in the viewer.
Systems based on such approaches can be used for creating persuasive ads, intuitive
educational material, aesthetic pleasing art, and so on [32].
6.3 Is Creativity Computational?
We now return back to the question we raised in the introduction: Can creativity be
algorithmic? Or is it essentially a human quality? To examine such questions, let us
consider two different characterizations of creativity. The first one focuses on the
process by which a human being engages in a creative pursuit. If we try to think
of creative people, who comes to mind? Perhaps Einstein, Mozart, Michelangelo or
Leonardo da Vinci. In the modern times, we might think of Steve Jobs. But what do
we mean when we say that they are creative?
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Perhaps music came naturally to Mozart. In a letter to his father on Nov. 8, 1777,
he wrote: “I cannot write in verse, for I am no poet. I cannot arrange the parts of
speech with such art as to produce effects of light and shade, for I am no painter.
Even by signs and gestures I cannot express my thoughts and feelings, for I am no
dancer. But I can do so by means of sounds, for I am a musician.” Perhaps one could
say that his brain was structured in a certain way that generated musical patterns
naturally. Of course, what makes his work great is because of the way people have
responded to his music over more than two centuries. (See also [37, 47].)
Or consider mentally different people, like the case of Stephen Wiltshire, discussed
in [55]. Sir Wiltshire has an amazing ability to draw a landscape from memory after
seeing it only once. Though he is diagnosed with autism, his work is highly regarded
both by critics and general population. He was awarded Member of the Order of the
British Empire for services to art in 2006. So he is no doubt a very creative person,
no matter which criterion one chooses to apply.
But let us think about it a minute. What do we mean by saying that he is creative?
His work has a certain style, level of details that most people cannot reach, aesthetic
appeal, and all that. As with Mozart, we can go further and say that perhaps this is
the way he expresses himself naturally: just like you and I might describe what we
did on our last summer vacation, he draws fantastic landscapes.
We can now throw in here examples of people with schizophrenia or brain damage,
savants or manic-depressive people, and so on [57]. When these people produce work
that is considered creative, often this is their mode of being, and it could not have
been otherwise. (See also [1, 17].) Many times the intention is missing as well.
Einstein’s brain was preserved after his death so that people can study it to get
any clues about the biological basis for creativity. But it is not like he was creative
every day of his life. It is the impact of his theory of relativity, and its eventual
acceptance by the scientific community that was a key factor in him becoming an
icon of scientific creativity of the twentieth century. Moreover, Einstein was also
dogmatic at times, perhaps the most famous case being his rejection of Alexander
Friedmann’s expanding universe hypothesis [61].
If we were to model Einstein’s creative process, what would we model? There
have been some computational models of scientific discovery, but they almost always
greatly simplify the process by putting a number of assumptions in place as to what
is significant and what is not. At that point, it is not clear at all if they are modeling
the actual mental process of the creative person at the time of the creative act. (See
also [5].)
Such examples suggest that the so-called creative humans use a variety of heuris-
tics, some of them consciously and some subconsciously, for creating artifacts or for
problem solving. Many of these heuristics can be mechanized, and in principle there
seems to be no reason to consider any of them non-algorithmic.
The second characterization of creativity focuses on the nature of creative artifacts.
It takes only the audience’s perspective, so the creator is not even mentioned. We
refer to Barthes’ [3] articulation: “We know that to restore to writing its future, we
must reverse its myth: the birth of the reader must be ransomed by the death of the
Author,” though he traced this view to even earlier scholars. Though not everyone
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subscribes to this extreme position, most accounts of creativity do acknowledge the
role of the audience [12, 13, 22, 41].
In the audience-based view of creativity, it is generally accepted that in order for
an artifact to be deemed creative, it must be novel and useful. We have argued above
(Sec. 6.2.1) that novelty is cognitively difficult for people because we are constrained
by our previous conceptual associations. Researchers who study creativity have come
up with various techniques to overcome this difficulty. However, computers and AI
systems, which do not have any such associations, have a great advantage here, for
they can search the unchartered areas of novel concepts and conceptual combination
more systematically [19, 31].
However, to automatically assess the usefulness of created artifacts is a different
cup of tea altogether. As the usefulness is necessarily from a human point of view,
the question becomes: Can an algorithm capture usefulness to humans? Here, we
can distinguish two different aspects of usefulness. One is aesthetics, which relates
to artistic creativity. In this regard, there has been some research to suggest that at
least some of our aesthetic values are hardwired in the structure of the brain [52, 68].
Moreover, machine-learning techniques have been applied to learn about the cultural
preferences of an audience based on the past data. For instance, Ni et al. [45] trained
their program with the official UK top-40 singles chart over the past 50 years to learn
as to what makes a song popular. A program like this might successfully predict, for
instance, the winner of the future Eurovision competitions. However, a limitation of
these approaches is that they cannot predict drastic changes in the aesthetic values
and tastes: for example atonal music, or abstract art. Moreover, creativity is not the
same as popularity. So to be able to predict whether a song, or a book, or a video
will become popular [63] is not the same thing as evaluating their creativity.
This problem becomes more severe when we move beyond arts, and consider
creativity in problem solving, and in science and technology. Here the usefulness of
a novel and creative idea comes down to simply whether it works. This clearly has an
objective component, for in a sense it is the reality that determines whether the idea
works or not. History of science and technology is full of many interesting and novel
ideas that did not work. Prehistory of flight [20] is a rich domain of examples where
many novel ideas that were based on numerous observations, experimentations, and
in which inventors had complete faith, did not work at all. The following examples
provide further support for this argument (see also [28, 48]):
1. Schön [58, 59] described the case of a product-development team in the 1940s,
which was working to develop a synthetic-fiber paintbrush that would yield
smoothly painted surfaces like the natural-fiber paintbrush did. They came up with
an innovative and successful design using the painting-as-pumping metaphor.
However, during the problem-solving phase, they also considered painting as
masking-a-surface metaphor, which was quite a novel idea, but it led to no useful
insight.
2. Yolanda Baie, a food stand operator and owner, petitioned to have the kitchen of
her house, where she prepared food sold at the food stand, qualify as a home office
for the purpose of tax deduction (Baie vs. C.I.R., 74 T.C. 105), using the argument
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that her kitchen was a manufacturing facility for her business. The judges, while
finding the argument ‘ingenious and appealing,’ ruled it ‘insufficient’ nonetheless.
3. John Casti ([5, pp. 7–10]) comments on the fate of Immanuel Velikovsky’s theory
as outlined in Worlds in Collision, which hypothesized Earth’s encounters with
a large comet expelled from Jupiter and provided explanations for many biblical
events. Velikovsky’s theory proposes a novel understanding of the Solar system,
but the scientific community has not accepted it.
Considering such examples, we suggest that this usefulness aspect of creativity
remains essentially non-algorithmic, but not because humans are special, and cog-
nitive processes cannot be computational, but because nature is not bounded by the
limits of our cognitive models. To elaborate this further, whether an object flies or
not (which is the usefulness of the idea) does not depend on how beautiful or elegant
the theory is, or how much effort and emotional energy the creator has invested in
the object, and so on. In other words, usefulness cannot be addressed from within
the cognitive model, but it must be applied and tested in the real world.
Thus, creativity, in our view, represents the open-endedness of our interaction
with the environment, and cannot be captured in a cognitive or computational model.
Nonetheless, we can have computational models of creativity in limited domains, and
computational systems can be designed to stimulate and enhance general creativity
in people.
We can contrast our position with some other approaches to model creativity,
notably among them being the FACE and IDEA models proposed Colton and his
colleagues [10, 11, 49, 50]. The FACE model formalizes novelty by explicitly iden-
tifying eight dimensions along which an object can be considered novel. To comple-
ment this, the IDEA model formalizes the impact of the artifact (so the usefulness) by
assuming how it affects an ideal audience. Two dimensions are identified to measure
the impact on the audience: one refers to how the well being of the audience has
changed in response to the artifact or the work, and the other refers to the cognitive
effort required to appreciate the artifact.
Our position is consistent with the FACE model, except that the FACE model is
more detailed in its explicit identification of various ways in which novelty can be
generated. However, the position we have articulated here with respect to usefulness
essentially implies that the goal of the IDEA model is not attainable. First of all,
it is very difficult to characterize an ideal audience. Moreover, as the character of
the audience—and here we include both the nature of the individual members of the
audience and the membership of the audience—changes as a result of interacting
with the artifact, and changes in quite unpredictable ways, it is nearly impossible to
measure the two parameters posited in the IDEA model. One only has to consider the
history of art genre like atonal music, minimalist music, abstract visual art, conceptual
art, and how they gradually became accepted by the audience to appreciate this point.
Finally, for scientific creativity and real-world problem solving, the audience is the
nature or the real world, which ultimately accepts or rejects the artifact, and this
response cannot be modeled, as we have argued above. Nevertheless, in restricted
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domains, it may be possible to make certain assumptions about the audience, and so
IDEA model can be useful in a limited way.
6.4 Conclusions
To summarize the main arguments of this chapter, we would like to rearticulate
them in another way. It is generally accepted that the two main characteristics of
creativity are originality and intelligibility: the product must be novel or the process
must generate a new perspective; and the product or the generated perspective must
be intelligible in order to be useful for at least some audience [2, 56, 67]. For
novelty, research on real-world creativity shows that it is difficult for people to step
out of their conventional and habitual conceptual associations. To overcome this
inertia, several methods like making the familiar strange [18], concept displacement
[58], bisociation [36], lateral thinking [14], estrangement [54], conceptual blending
[15], and so on, have been proposed in the literature. However, computers do not
have this inertia, and so they can be very effectively used to generate novel ideas.
This argument has been presented in more detail elsewhere [31]. Our experience in
developing creativity-assistive systems (reviewed in Sect. 6.2) lends supports to this
hypothesis.
However, when it comes to incorporating usefulness of the generated perspective
or idea, we have argued that, in general, it is not possible to capture this aspect of
creativity algorithmically. The reason is simply that when a new object or style is
introduced, people react to it in different ways. Sometimes they adapt to it right away;
at other times they do not find it interesting or useful at first, but the same object
or style introduced at a later time becomes a big success; and sometimes they do
not find it useful at all, in spite of the efforts made by the creators to convince them
otherwise.
Nevertheless, one cannot rule out the possibility that in limited domains we might
be able to characterize usefulness algorithmically, and to design and implement com-
puter systems that can generate statistically a larger number of useful and interesting
artifacts and ideas. So combining this with novelty-generating systems, we can have
computer systems that are creative. Systems like Aaron exemplify this approach.
However, even in a limited domain, once usefulness is characterized algorithmi-
cally, it loses its novelty, and gradually ceases to be creative. (See, for instance, the
model of literary style change proposed by Martindale [42].) So while, we may be
able to model some aspect of creativity within a style (with respect to usefulness),
it remains doubtful whether creative changes in styles can be modeled successfully
in a universal way. Again, to emphasize, novelty can be modeled—it is relatively
easy to computationally generate new styles, but the problem is to incorporate which
styles will be successful (meaning people will adapt to them and find them useful).
Therefore, we claim that this usefulness aspect of creativity will always remain the
last frontier for computational modeling techniques.
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